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Prepare and test your skills
Free sample question, answered and explained below. The Professional Cloud Architect practice bank has 2,335 more like it. Try 10 free: instant score, no account.
A financial enterprise uses Cloud Key Management Service (Cloud KMS) to manage customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) that protect sensitive workloads across multiple Google Cloud storage services. The enterprise uses envelope encryption where Cloud KMS manages the Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) that wrap individual Data Encryption Keys (DEKs).
To comply with regulatory standards and minimize the impact of potential key compromise, the security team needs to implement an automated key rotation schedule for their KEKs. They also must ensure that all previously stored data remains accessible after key rotation occurs.
What happens when an automated rotation schedule rotates a Cloud KMS key, and what administrative action is required to ensure existing data remains readable?
This option confuses creating a new key version within an existing Cloud KMS CryptoKey resource with creating an entirely new CryptoKey resource and scheduling deletion of the old resource.
A security policy mandated provisioning entirely separate CryptoKey URIs and updating all resource CMEK configurations across Google Cloud manually.
In Cloud Key Management Service (Cloud KMS), keys are structured as multi-version resources. When managing Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) under an envelope encryption model, a key contains one or more key versions. One version is designated as the primary key version, which is automatically used for all new encryption operations.

Enabled, Disabled, Scheduled for destruction, and Destroyed states.This architecture guarantees business continuity and zero downtime for read operations while enforcing strict cryptographic hygiene and compliance through automated versioning.
This option incorrectly asserts that rotating a key automatically sets historical key versions to the Disabled state upon creation of a new primary version.
The organization had an explicit security incident response requiring the quarantine of prior key versions to block all read operations immediately.
This option describes an in-place destructive key overwrite model, which is fundamentally contrary to how versioned cryptographic key management systems operate.
A system used single-state, unversioned static symmetric keys where key update procedures required immediate in-place replacement and data re-wrapping.
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