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An organization is deploying Secure Web Proxy to inspect and control outbound HTTPS traffic from Compute Engine VMs. The security team has defined the following requirements:
updates.vendor.com, which enforces certificate pinning.Which configuration should the network engineer implement?
GatewaySecurityPolicy to the Secure Web Proxy Gateway with a TlsInspectionPolicy configured with DIRECT_LEAF_PROVISIONING, rely on the Mozilla Root Program public CAs on the client VMs for trust validation, create a higher-priority (lower integer) SessionMatcher-only allow rule for updates.vendor.com, and configure lower-priority SessionMatcher and ApplicationMatcher rules without setting tlsInspectionEnabled on individual rules.This configuration correctly selects GatewaySecurityPolicy, DIRECT_LEAF_PROVISIONING, and higher-priority bypass ordering for updates.vendor.com, but it misconfigures both PKI trust validation and per-rule TLS inspection flags.
TlsInspectionPolicy to a GatewaySecurityPolicy does not automatically decrypt traffic for every rule. Each HTTPS rule that uses ApplicationMatcher must explicitly set tlsInspectionEnabled: true; otherwise, the rule is skipped for HTTPS traffic and URL paths or HTTP methods cannot be inspected.tlsInspectionEnabled: true acts as an explicit per-rule switch limiting decryption to the SessionMatcher scope of that specific rule.The private root CA certificate from the CA Service pool were distributed to every client VM's trust store AND tlsInspectionEnabled: true were explicitly configured on each ApplicationMatcher rule.
Network engineers frequently confuse backend server verification (which uses public Mozilla Root Program CAs automatically) with client-to-proxy trust (which always requires distributing the organization's private root CA).
GatewaySecurityPolicy to the Secure Web Proxy Gateway with a TlsInspectionPolicy configured with LOCAL_INTERMEDIATE_CA_SIGNING, install the private root CA certificate in the client VMs' trust stores, create a higher-priority (lower integer) ApplicationMatcher rule with sessionMatcher: true and tlsInspectionEnabled: true, and configure a lower-priority SessionMatcher-only allow rule for updates.vendor.com.LOCAL_INTERMEDIATE_CA_SIGNING and this rule ordering doIn LOCAL_INTERMEDIATE_CA_SIGNING mode, Secure Web Proxy fetches a single intermediate CA certificate from CA Service, caches it locally, and signs leaf certificates directly on the proxy. Meanwhile, gateway security rules are evaluated in ascending numerical order, where lower integers represent higher priority and evaluation stops at the first matching rule.
ApplicationMatcher rule (sessionMatcher: true and tlsInspectionEnabled: true) at a higher priority (lower integer) than the updates.vendor.com rule causes Secure Web Proxy to intercept and attempt TLS decryption for updates.vendor.com first. Because updates.vendor.com uses certificate pinning, the client detects the proxy-generated certificate and terminates the connection.LOCAL_INTERMEDIATE_CA_SIGNING reduces CA Service transaction fees by refreshing the intermediate CA roughly once per day, at the expense of per-domain audit trails.sessionMatcher: true: Matching all sessions at high priority forces unnecessary TLS decryption across all traffic unless scoped narrowly.The organization wanted to minimize CA Service transaction costs rather than log every leaf certificate in CA Service, AND the rule priorities were reversed so the SessionMatcher-only bypass rule for updates.vendor.com had a lower integer (higher priority) than the TLS inspection rules.
To prevent unintended TLS interception, non-inspected SessionMatcher rules must always carry a lower integer priority than ApplicationMatcher rules, and ApplicationMatcher rules should be narrowly scoped with SessionMatcher.
GatewaySecurityPolicy to the Secure Web Proxy Gateway with a TlsInspectionPolicy configured with DIRECT_LEAF_PROVISIONING, install the private root CA certificate in the client VMs' trust stores, create a higher-priority (lower integer) SessionMatcher-only allow rule for updates.vendor.com, and configure lower-priority rules using SessionMatcher (for service accounts and URL lists) and ApplicationMatcher with tlsInspectionEnabled: true.GatewaySecurityPolicy with DIRECT_LEAF_PROVISIONING isA gateway security policy (GatewaySecurityPolicy) is the core zero-trust (deny-all by default) access control resource for standard outbound web traffic in Secure Web Proxy. When paired with a TLS inspection policy (TlsInspectionPolicy) and Certificate Authority Service (CA Service), it acts as a trusted intermediary that terminates client TLS handshakes, inspects decrypted HTTP payloads, and re-encrypts traffic to external destinations.
GatewaySecurityPolicy rules natively evaluate service accounts, secure tags, and reusable URL lists via SessionMatcher, while ApplicationMatcher inspects decrypted URL paths, HTTP methods, and headers.certificateIssuanceMode to DIRECT_LEAF_PROVISIONING forces Secure Web Proxy to query CA Service for every unique destination domain, ensuring every leaf certificate request is logged in CA Service audit logs.SessionMatcher for updates.vendor.com establishes a TCP tunnel without decryption before lower-priority TLS inspection rules are evaluated.tlsInspectionEnabled: true only on specific ApplicationMatcher rules limits decryption strictly to matching traffic.This architecture is the only configuration that simultaneously supports URL lists and ApplicationMatcher path/method inspection, guarantees per-domain certificate logging in CA Service, preserves certificate-pinned connections through proper rule priority ordering, and satisfies client PKI trust requirements.
AuthzPolicy to the Secure Web Proxy Gateway using service account rules, URL lists, and regex URL matching, associate a TlsInspectionPolicy configured with DIRECT_LEAF_PROVISIONING, install the private root CA certificate in the client VMs' trust stores, and configure a higher-priority (lower integer) L4 rule to bypass TLS inspection for updates.vendor.com.AuthzPolicy doesAn authorization policy (AuthzPolicy) provides a unified, identity-centric access control mechanism across Google Cloud services such as Secure Web Proxy, Application Load Balancer, and Cloud Service Mesh. It excels at validating frontend mutual TLS (mTLS) client certificates and delegating advanced request authorization or content sanitization to external engines via Service Extensions.
AuthzPolicy fails to meet the granular filtering requirement.ApplicationMatcher expressions is designed for gateway security policies (GatewaySecurityPolicy) rather than AuthzPolicy.Gateway can actively enforce either a GatewaySecurityPolicy or an AuthzPolicy, not both simultaneously; applying an AuthzPolicy causes existing gateway security rules to be ignored.AuthzPolicy supports custom authorization extensions and Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP) delegation, which are not available in GatewaySecurityPolicy.AuthzPolicy uses the same API schema across multiple Google Cloud networking products.The organization needed frontend mTLS client verification, Service Extensions integration for custom authorization logic, or Agent Gateway governance (such as Model Armor and MCP method filtering) rather than reusable URL lists and regex URL filtering.
A common misconception is that AuthzPolicy is a strict superset of GatewaySecurityPolicy. While AuthzPolicy offers superior identity and extension features, GatewaySecurityPolicy remains necessary when URL lists or regex-based URL matching are required.
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