Prepare and test your skills

Prepare and test your skills

Free sample question with answers and detailed explanation below. The Professional Cloud Network Engineer practice bank has an additional 2,437 practice questions.Try 10 free realistic questions: instant score, no credit card, and no account required.
Your organization runs production Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters in a Shared VPC service project (app-gke-prod) attached to a host project (net-host-prod). On-premises administrators connect over Cloud Interconnect to manage the clusters. You must enforce the following security and governance controls:
Which configuration meets all of these requirements?
net-host-prod and app-gke-prod in separate VPC Service Controls perimeters linked by access levels, use VPC-SC access levels to authorize outbound GKE node requests to external Google APIs alongside GKE authorized networks, and grant roles/compute.networkViewer on net-host-prod to manage the scoped access policy.This option places the Shared VPC host and service projects into separate perimeters, misuses Access Context Manager access levels for both cross-perimeter communication and outbound node traffic, and assigns an incorrect Compute Engine IAM role for scoped policy administration.
net-host-prod) and service (app-gke-prod) projects must reside in the same perimeter.roles/compute.networkViewer provides compute.networks.get so an administrator can view or add a VPC network to a perimeter, but it grants no permissions to create, edit, or manage Access Context Manager scoped policies.roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor or roles/accesscontextmanager.policyAdmin bound directly on the scoped policy.roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor was bound directly on the scoped access policy.net-host-prod and app-gke-prod in the same VPC Service Controls perimeter, route Google API traffic to private.googleapis.com, retain GKE authorized networks for on-premises CIDRs, and grant the platform networking team roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor on the folder containing app-gke-prod to manage a scoped access policy.This option correctly places both the Shared VPC host project (net-host-prod) and service project (app-gke-prod) into a single VPC Service Controls (VPC-SC) perimeter and retains GKE control plane authorized networks. However, it introduces two critical security and IAM misconfigurations involving the private virtual IP (private.googleapis.com) and folder-level Access Context Manager IAM bindings.
private.googleapis.com (199.36.153.8/30) provides private network reachability to all Google APIs and services, including services not supported or restricted by VPC Service Controls. Allowing a path to the private VIP negates VPC-SC protection against insider data exfiltration.roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor on a folder (or project) has no effect on scoped access policies. Access Context Manager permissions do not inherit down from folders or projects to scoped policies.private.googleapis.com vs. restricted.googleapis.com: While private.googleapis.com keeps traffic off the public internet, it allows workloads inside the perimeter to reach non-VPC-SC APIs and external endpoints unless blocked by strict egress firewalls.accesscontextmanager.policies.create permission can initially create and delegate a scoped policy.restricted.googleapis.com (199.36.153.4/30) or a Private Service Connect vpc-sc endpoint instead of private.googleapis.com, androles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor binding was applied directly on the scoped access policy resource rather than on the folder.app-gke-prod in the VPC Service Controls perimeter while keeping net-host-prod outside, route Google API traffic via restricted.googleapis.com, rely on GKE authorized networks and VPC-SC access levels instead of IAM for cluster administration, and bind roles/accesscontextmanager.policyAdmin on app-gke-prod.This option correctly selects restricted.googleapis.com for private Google API connectivity, but it isolates the Shared VPC service project (app-gke-prod) from its host project (net-host-prod), attempts to replace IAM with network and perimeter controls, and applies an Access Context Manager role at the project level.
net-host-prod). Separating net-host-prod and app-gke-prod across the perimeter boundary causes networking and managed services—including GKE control plane integrations—to behave unpredictably or fail entirely.app-gke-prod, any overly privileged principal operating from an approved IP address or inside the perimeter could modify GKE authorized networks or delete clusters.roles/accesscontextmanager.policyAdmin on a project (app-gke-prod) has no effect on scoped access policies.net-host-prod was placed in the same service perimeter as app-gke-prod,roles/accesscontextmanager.policyAdmin (or policyEditor) was bound directly on the scoped access policy rather than on the project.net-host-prod and app-gke-prod in the same VPC Service Controls perimeter, route Google API traffic via restricted.googleapis.com (199.36.153.4/30), combine GKE authorized networks with VPC-SC ingress rules or access levels and project IAM roles, and bind roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor directly on the scoped access policy resource.This architecture layers three complementary controls for defense in depth: GKE control plane authorized networks restrict network-level IP access to the Kubernetes API server endpoint, VPC Service Controls (VPC-SC) enforce a context-based perimeter around Google Cloud APIs (including container.googleapis.com and data services), and IAM governs granular identity-based permissions on cluster and perimeter resources.
net-host-prod) and service project (app-gke-prod) in the same service perimeter ensures uninterrupted Shared VPC operation. Routing Google API requests to restricted.googleapis.com (199.36.153.4/30) (or a vpc-sc Private Service Connect bundle) ensures workloads only access VPC-SC-supported services privately without internet exposure or exfiltration paths.roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor directly on the scoped policy resource grants the platform networking team full management over that perimeter without granting organization-wide access policy privileges.kubectl are blocked by GKE authorized networks, and unauthorized users inside the perimeter are blocked by IAM.Unlike options that expose private.googleapis.com, split the Shared VPC host and service projects across perimeters, or misplace IAM bindings on folders or projects, this configuration aligns network, perimeter, and identity controls across every layer.
Answer them yourself and get your score the moment you finish. No account needed.
Full access includes
Keep the momentum going with these hand-picked practice scenarios
Last updated Validated