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Your organization uses Google Cloud Armor Enterprise to protect a web application behind a global external Application Load Balancer. Incoming requests pass through an upstream proxy that adds the original client IP address to the True-Client-IP HTTP header.
You must configure a Cloud Armor backend security policy to:
True-Client-IP instead of the proxy IP.203.0.113.0/24 to prevent false positives for a partner network.Which configuration should you implement?
Google Threat Intelligence in Google Cloud Armor Enterprise allows security policies to match incoming traffic against continuously updated, Google-managed IP threat feeds using the evaluateThreatIntelligence() Common Expression Language (CEL) function. When traffic passes through an upstream proxy or CDN, the origin.user_ip attribute instructs Cloud Armor to inspect the original client IP address extracted from a designated HTTP request header rather than the direct network peer IP (origin.ip).
iplist-known-malicious-ips feed instructs Cloud Armor to match requests against Google's continuously updated list of IP addresses known to attack web applications and enforce a deny action at the network edge.userIpRequestHeaders with True-Client-IP inside the security policy's advancedOptionsConfig field enables origin.user_ip to extract the real client IP from that header instead of evaluating the upstream proxy's IP address.['203.0.113.0/24'] as the exclusion list parameter prevents any address within that CIDR range from matching the rule, eliminating false positives for the partner network.origin.user_ip via userIpRequestHeaders[] ensures accurate client filtering in multi-tier proxy architectures.iplist-tor-exit-nodes, iplist-vpn-providers, and iplist-anon-proxies.Unlike maintaining static IP denylists or customer-managed address groups, Google Threat Intelligence feeds scale dynamically without manual curation or IP-per-rule quota overhead. Pairing evaluateThreatIntelligence() with origin.user_ip and advancedOptionsConfig.userIpRequestHeaders ensures accurate client identification behind upstream proxies while keeping exception handling inline within a single rule.
The evaluateThreatIntelligence(string, LIST) expression format evaluates a Google Threat Intelligence feed as its first argument and applies an IP or CIDR exclusion list as its second argument. Because the optional IP-source string parameter is omitted in this configuration, Cloud Armor automatically defaults to evaluating origin.ip, which represents the immediate Layer 3 source IP address connecting to the load balancer.
origin.ip resolves to the proxy's IP address rather than the original client IP contained in the True-Client-IP HTTP header.iplist-known-malicious-ips check because Cloud Armor inspects the proxy's address instead of the client's address.evaluateThreatIntelligence() to origin.ip.origin.user_ip (paired with userIpRequestHeaders) or a header source, Cloud Armor ignores custom client-IP headers during threat feed matching.['203.0.113.0/24'] exclusion list only applies to whichever IP attribute is being evaluated, meaning it cannot protect partner clients behind an upstream proxy when inspecting origin.ip.End-user clients connected directly to the global external Application Load Balancer without an upstream proxy in front of Google Cloud, in which case origin.ip would accurately represent the true client IP address.
evaluateAddressGroup() is a Cloud Armor CEL function that matches incoming client IP addresses against a customer-managed Address Group resource (or evaluateOrganizationAddressGroup() for organization-scoped groups). It accepts the address group name, an IP-source string such as origin.ip or origin.user_ip, and an optional CIDR exclusion list.
iplist-known-malicious-ips is a Google-managed Threat Intelligence feed, not a user-defined Address Group. Passing a Threat Intelligence feed name to evaluateAddressGroup() does not ingest or query Google's threat intelligence data.userIpRequestHeaders properly configured for True-Client-IP, the rule cannot leverage Google's continuously updated malicious IP feeds unless it invokes evaluateThreatIntelligence().iplist-known-malicious-ips, iplist-tor-exit-nodes, and iplist-vpn-providers) are maintained exclusively by Google and must be referenced via evaluateThreatIntelligence().evaluateAddressGroup() and evaluateThreatIntelligence() support origin.user_ip and exclusion lists, which makes them easy to confuse.Your organization maintained its own custom Address Group resource named iplist-known-malicious-ips with manually curated IP ranges instead of using Google-managed Threat Intelligence feeds.
When combining custom corporate IP lists with Google-managed threat feeds, organizations often use evaluateAddressGroup() for internal or partner allowlists/denylists alongside separate evaluateThreatIntelligence() rules for automated threat blocking.
In Google Cloud Armor, origin.user_ip is a special CEL attribute used to reference the end-user IP address forwarded by an intermediary proxy or third-party CDN. However, origin.user_ip does not automatically inspect arbitrary HTTP headers; it relies on policy-level metadata defined in advancedOptionsConfig.userIpRequestHeaders[] to identify which request header carries the client IP.
True-Client-IP to userIpRequestHeaders in the security policy's advancedOptionsConfig field, Cloud Armor has no instruction telling it to extract the client IP from the True-Client-IP header when evaluating origin.user_ip.iplist-known-malicious-ips feed, origin.user_ip, and the ['203.0.113.0/24'] exclusion list, omitting the advancedOptionsConfig setting prevents proper extraction of the forwarded client IP.origin.user_ip in any Cloud Armor rule expression requires configuring userIpRequestHeaders[] inside advancedOptionsConfig.userIpRequestHeaders[] at the security policy level lets multiple rules reference origin.user_ip consistently without repeating header parsing logic.advancedOptionsConfig controls policy-wide parsing behaviors such as client IP header extraction and JSON/body inspection limits.The userIpRequestHeaders list in the security policy's advancedOptionsConfig had already been configured with True-Client-IP, leaving only the rule creation step remaining.
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