Prepare and test your skills

Prepare and test your skills

Free sample question with answers and detailed explanation below. The Professional Cloud Network Engineer practice bank has an additional 2,437 practice questions.Try 10 free realistic questions: instant score, no credit card, and no account required.
An application VM web-vm (10.10.1.5) in vpc-web cannot establish a TCP connection on port 8443 to api-vm (10.20.2.10) in vpc-api. The vpc-api network is peered with both vpc-web and vpc-shared-services. You run forward and reverse Connectivity Tests and observe the following outputs:
| Test Direction | Overall Result | Live Data Plane | Key Trace Details |
|---|---|---|---|
Forward (web-vm to api-vm, TCP 8443) | Reachable (Deliver) | 10/10 packets delivered | APPLY_EGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE verified via org-egress-policy (displays "No permission to view resource in organization"); APPLY_ROUTE verified; APPLY_INGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE verified. |
Reverse (api-vm to web-vm, TCP 8443 to 51420) | Unreachable (Drop) | Not applicable | APPLY_EGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE verified; APPLY_ROUTE matched imported-route-10-10-1-0-25 (next hop: peering vpc-shared-services); Final state: Drop (ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK). |
What is the root cause of the connectivity failure?
api-vm is silently dropping incoming TCP port 8443 traffic, because both forward configuration analysis and live data plane probes succeeded.Connectivity Tests evaluates Google Cloud VPC configurations (routes, firewall rules, forwarding rules) and runs hypervisor-to-hypervisor live data plane analysis probes, but it does not inspect software inside the VM's guest operating system (such as iptables, nftables, or Windows Firewall). When both forward configuration analysis (Deliver) and live data plane probing (10/10 packets delivered) succeed while an application still fails, a guest OS firewall is one possible culprit—but only if return-path VPC routing is also healthy.
api-vm to web-vm are dropped at the VPC layer (ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK) before ever reaching web-vm.web-vm's hypervisor to api-vm's hypervisor (10/10 packets delivered). It does not test the return path, so asymmetric routing breaks TCP connections despite 100% forward probe delivery.A guest OS firewall (or an application not listening on port 8443) would be the likely root cause if both the forward and reverse Connectivity Tests returned Reachable (Deliver) and full live data plane delivery, yet TCP connections still timed out.
org-egress-policy prevented Connectivity Tests from evaluating an egress deny rule blocking web-vm on the forward path.When a user lacks IAM permissions to inspect an organization- or folder-level hierarchical firewall policy, Connectivity Tests displays a notice such as "No permission to view resource in organization" on the trace card. However, the configuration analyzer still evaluates the effective firewall rules applied to the VPC network and accurately reports whether the rule permits or denies the simulated packet.
APPLY_EGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE is explicitly marked verified, meaning org-egress-policy allowed the packet rather than blocking it.10/10 packets, proving that no VPC or hierarchical egress deny rule is dropping forward traffic from web-vm in the actual data plane.APPLY_ROUTE with ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK.Abort final state (PERMISSION_DENIED or UNKNOWN_NETWORK) with an Undetermined overall result.Deliver result when traffic is actually denied by that policy.This diagnosis would point to an IAM visibility barrier if the Connectivity Test returned an overall result of Undetermined with an Abort final state (PERMISSION_DENIED or UNKNOWN_NETWORK), preventing the analyzer from completing the forward trace.
vpc-api from vpc-shared-services is diverting return packets for web-vm to the wrong VPC network (ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK), causing asymmetric routing failure.In Connectivity Tests, the ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK drop state indicates that a simulated packet matched an active route whose next hop forwards traffic into an unintended VPC network rather than the destination endpoint's network. Because VPC routing decisions are stateless and evaluated independently in each direction using longest-prefix match, a more specific /25 route (imported-route-10-10-1-0-25) overrides the /24 peered subnet route to vpc-web.
vpc-api, and ingress firewall rules on api-vm all allow the packet (Deliver). Live data plane analysis reports 10/10 packets delivered because active probing measures unidirectional delivery from source to destination hypervisor.api-vm back to web-vm passes egress firewall checks (APPLY_EGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE) and then matches imported-route-10-10-1-0-25 during APPLY_ROUTE, sending return packets toward vpc-shared-services instead of vpc-web.api-vm, SYN-ACK return packets are diverted to vpc-shared-services, preventing the three-way TCP handshake from completing.APPLY_ROUTE card identifies the specific route name (imported-route-10-10-1-0-25) and next hop causing the misrouting.APPLY_ROUTE with ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK before reaching destination firewall evaluation, isolating the fault to routing.This explanation accounts for every detail across both tests—successful forward Deliver and 10/10 live delivery, effective evaluation of org-egress-policy, and the explicit ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK drop on the reverse APPLY_ROUTE step—without misattributing the failure to IAM permissions, stateful firewalls, or guest OS filtering.
vpc-web is dropping return packets from api-vm, requiring a new ingress allow rule for return traffic from 10.20.2.10.Google Cloud VPC firewall rules are stateful. When a client VM such as web-vm initiates an outbound TCP connection that is permitted by egress firewall rules, connection tracking automatically allows the corresponding return packets back to web-vm, even if an implied or explicit ingress deny rule would otherwise block unsolicited inbound traffic on that port.
api-vm to web-vm), the simulated packet drops at APPLY_ROUTE inside vpc-api (ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK). Because the packet never routes to vpc-web, Connectivity Tests never reaches APPLY_INGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE on web-vm.vpc-web and reported a Drop with reason FIREWALL_RULE, the real data plane would still permit return traffic for an existing TCP session initiated by web-vm.vpc-web will not resolve a routing misconfiguration inside vpc-api.FIREWALL_RULE even when data-plane connection tracking allows return flows.APPLY_ROUTE), and finally destination ingress firewall rules.FIREWALL_RULE (or FIREWALL_BLOCKING_LOAD_BALANCER_BACKEND_HEALTH_CHECK), whereas routing failures report codes like ROUTE_WRONG_NETWORK, NO_ROUTE, or ROUTE_BLACKHOLE.An overly restrictive firewall rule would be the root cause if the forward test (web-vm to api-vm) terminated at APPLY_INGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE or APPLY_EGRESS_FIREWALL_RULE with a final Drop state of FIREWALL_RULE.
Answer them yourself and get your score the moment you finish. No account needed.
Full access includes
Keep the momentum going with these hand-picked practice scenarios
Last updated Validated