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You manage a Google Cloud Armor security policy named shared-edge-policy attached to three external Application Load Balancer backend services: checkout-service, api-service, and catalog-service. The policy currently contains two allow rules at priorities 100 (partner IP ranges) and 500 (corporate IP ranges), plus the default allow rule at priority 2147483647.
In Security Command Center, you observe an Allowed traffic spike finding targeting checkout-service alongside an Application DDoS Attacks finding from Adaptive Protection. Inspecting the Adaptive Protection alert in the Cloud Armor dashboard and Cloud Logging reveals the following metrics:
| Signal / Metric | Observed Value |
|---|---|
confidence | 0.84 |
attackSize | 12000 QPS |
suggestedRule.action | DENY |
suggestedRule.expression | evaluateAdaptiveProtection('11275630857957031521') |
impactedAttackProportion | 0.95 |
impactedBaselineProportion | 0.001 |
impactedBaselinePolicyProportion | 0.16 |
How should you interpret these threat intelligence signals and adjust your Cloud Armor configuration?
0.16 impactedBaselinePolicyProportion indicates legitimate organic growth that Adaptive Protection misclassified. Report an event error on the alert in the Cloud Armor dashboard to retrain the detection model, and raise the Cloud Logging alerting policy confidence threshold above 0.90.Reporting an event error in the Cloud Armor Adaptive Protection dashboard provides feedback that a flagged anomaly is actually normal, accepted traffic so the local machine learning models retrain to avoid similar alerts in the future. Raising a Cloud Logging alerting policy threshold above 0.90 suppresses operational notifications for alerts with lower confidence scores.
Short_Term_Allowed_RPS to Long_Term_Allowed_RPS on a per-backend basis specifically to surface potential Layer 7 DDoS attacks that are currently bypassing existing rules and reaching the backend.confidence score of 0.84 at 12000 QPS—coupled with impactedAttackProportion: 0.95 and impactedBaselineProportion: 0.001 on checkout-service—strongly indicates a genuine, targeted L7 attack rather than benign organic growth.0.90 would blind operators to real high-confidence attacks (which typically warrant alerting starting at confidence > 0.5).0.16 across the policy vs 0.001 on the target) reflects shared-policy differences, not an invalid attack detection.Investigation of request logs proved that the 12000 QPS surge on checkout-service was a legitimate scheduled marketing event or load test and you wanted to prevent future false alarms.
shared-edge-policy, deploy an evaluateAdaptiveProtectionAutoDeploy() rule at priority 1000 in enforce mode, and monitor Security Command Center for the Increasing deny ratio finding to confirm when the attack on checkout-service has cleared.Using evaluateAdaptiveProtectionAutoDeploy() creates a placeholder rule that automatically applies an action when Adaptive Protection generates a signature. Meanwhile, the Increasing deny ratio finding in Security Command Center notifies operators when the proportion of incoming traffic blocked by user-configured Cloud Armor rules rises significantly.
1000): Because shared-edge-policy has allow rules at priorities 100 and 500, placing the mitigation rule at priority 1000 leaves it unable to inspect or block any traffic matching those higher-priority allow rules.checkout-service, api-service, and catalog-service on shared-edge-policy in enforce mode exposes the other two services to the 0.16 (16%) impactedBaselinePolicyProportion false-positive rate.You separated checkout-service into its own policy (or constrained the match expression to the target host/path), placed the placeholder rule at a higher priority than allow rules, and used the Adaptive Protection dashboard and Cloud Logging metrics—rather than waiting for an Increasing deny ratio alert—to verify the attack subsided.
checkout-service with minimal baseline impact there, but risks blocking 16% of legitimate traffic across the other backend services sharing the policy. Create a separate security policy for checkout-service, add the evaluateAdaptiveProtection() rule in preview mode at a priority numerically lower than 100, and verify its production impact before enforcing.When Cloud Armor Adaptive Protection detects a high-confidence Layer 7 DDoS attack (confidence: 0.84, attackSize: 12000 QPS) and generates a signature, it provides projected impact metrics across both the targeted backend service and the entire security policy. Separating impacted backends into dedicated security policies and deploying the suggested evaluateAdaptiveProtection() rule in preview mode at the highest logical priority ensures targeted mitigation without collateral disruption.
impactedBaselineProportion of 0.001 (0.1%) combined with an impactedAttackProportion of 0.95 (95%) confirms the signature isolates attack traffic targeting checkout-service with negligible false positives on that service. However, impactedBaselinePolicyProportion of 0.16 (16%) warns that the same signature matches 16% of normal baseline traffic across all backend services sharing shared-edge-policy (api-service and catalog-service).checkout-service isolates the mitigation so api-service and catalog-service are never exposed to the 16% false-positive rate.100 places the mitigation rule above existing allow rules so matching attack traffic cannot bypass mitigation.allow rule can later be placed at an even lower numerical priority.This approach combines accurate interpretation of Security Command Center and Adaptive Protection telemetry with Cloud Armor policy best practices—isolating the targeted backend, prioritizing the deny logic ahead of allow rules, and validating in preview mode.
0.001 impactedBaselineProportion confirms minimal legitimate traffic impact across all attached services, while impactedBaselinePolicyProportion represents traffic already mitigated by existing rules. Add the suggested rule directly in enforce mode to shared-edge-policy at priority 600 so the existing allow rules at priorities 100 and 500 are preserved.This option applies the suggested evaluateAdaptiveProtection() rule directly in enforce mode onto shared-edge-policy at a lower logical priority (600, which is evaluated after priorities 100 and 500), while keeping all three backend services attached to the same policy.
impactedBaselinePolicyProportion: The impactedBaselinePolicyProportion field does not measure already-mitigated traffic. Instead, it indicates the projected percentage of legitimate baseline traffic across all backend services in the same security policy that the suggested rule would match—here, 16% across checkout-service, api-service, and catalog-service combined.shared-edge-policy without separating checkout-service or validating in preview mode risks immediately dropping legitimate requests to api-service and catalog-service.600 means any malicious traffic matching the allow rules at priority 100 or 500 is immediately permitted and never reaches priority 600.allow rules cannot inspect or block traffic already matched by higher-priority allow entries.All three backend services shared identical traffic profiles resulting in a near-zero impactedBaselinePolicyProportion, preview mode had already validated zero false positives, and the rule was placed at a priority numerically lower than all allow rules (unless an intentional exception was desired).
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