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Free sample question, answered and explained below. The Professional Cloud Security Engineer practice bank has 1,343 more like it. Try 10 free: instant score, no account.
A security engineer is establishing access governance for automated multi-cloud pipelines and internal workloads that deploy infrastructure into Google Cloud. The architecture must satisfy the following security requirements:
Which set of actions should the security engineer implement?
This configuration implements the organization policy to stop static key creation and configures Workload Identity Federation, but it grants callers the administrative Service Account Admin (roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin) role at the project level.
roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin provides full administrative control over service accounts (such as creating, modifying, disabling, and deleting service accounts), which represents severe privilege escalation for pipeline callers that only need to generate execution tokens.roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin allows modifying IAM policies on service accounts, it is designed for identity lifecycle management rather than operational delegation via token creation.roles/iam.serviceAccountAdmin contains permissions such as iam.serviceAccounts.create, iam.serviceAccounts.delete, and iam.serviceAccounts.setIamPolicy.The external pipeline identity was an infrastructure provisioning tool (such as Terraform) whose primary responsibility was creating, configuring, and maintaining the lifecycle of service account objects themselves.
This configuration disables the creation of new service accounts entirely, configures Workload Identity Federation, and assigns the Service Account User role (roles/iam.serviceAccountUser) broadly across the entire project.
iam.disableServiceAccountCreation stops all teams from provisioning legitimate service accounts rather than blocking static private key downloads.iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken / iam.serviceAccounts.signBlob) needed to generate short-lived OAuth 2.0 access tokens.roles/iam.serviceAccountUser at the project level allows callers to attach any service account in the project, violating least-privilege scoping.roles/iam.serviceAccountUser cannot be used directly for API-driven service account impersonation.The goal was to prevent new service accounts from being created in a locked-down project and permit developers to attach pre-existing service accounts to Compute Engine instances across the entire project.
This option restricts the upload of external public keys using iam.disableServiceAccountKeyUpload, attempts to offload token signing to Cloud KMS, and assigns the Token Creator role globally at the organization root.
iam.disableServiceAccountKeyUpload constraint only prevents users from uploading user-generated public keys; it does not block Google from generating and downloading user-managed JSON private keys.roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator at the organization root level allows calling identities to mint tokens and impersonate every service account across all folders and projects in the entire organization.The organization had a specific requirement to disallow external public key uploads while managing a custom cryptographic token signing service inside Cloud KMS.
This architecture combines Google Cloud Organization Policy constraints, Workload Identity Federation, and resource-level IAM role bindings to establish secure credential delegation and completely remove static keys.
constraints/iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation Organization Policy at the root or folder level strictly prevents administrators and developers from creating new user-managed JSON or P12 service account private keys.roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator) role directly on individual target service accounts (instead of at the project or organization level) allows designated callers to impersonate the target service account and mint short-lived OAuth 2.0 access tokens with granular scope.roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator on the specific service account resource prevents calling principals from impersonating all other service accounts within the project.This approach aligns with Google Cloud's security best practices by replacing long-lived credentials with short-lived tokens, enforcing organizational guardrails, and scoping impersonation authority to specific service account resources.
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