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An enterprise security team is establishing authorization guardrails across Google Cloud resource hierarchies. The team needs to enforce the following access requirements on a folder named Production-Workloads:
developers@example.com from creating and deleting service account keys across all current and future projects in the folder, even if they hold broad project-level Owner or Editor IAM roles.breakglass-ops@example.com (whose members are also in developers@example.com) to retain full permissions to create and delete service account keys within these projects.Which configuration should the security team implement to satisfy these requirements?
This approach attempts to apply project-level IAM deny policies to individual child projects and rely on a newly granted custom IAM allow role to override the restriction for the operational response group.
iam.serviceAccountKeys.create to breakglass-ops@example.com in an allow policy has no effect if the users are also members of developers@example.com and no exceptionPrincipals are configured in the deny rule.breakglass-ops@example.com belong to developers@example.com, the deny rule evaluates to true for them and blocks access regardless of any project-level allow bindings.Allow policies could take precedence over deny policies, or if breakglass-ops@example.com members were entirely separated from developers@example.com and managed strictly through disjoint allow bindings.
Organization Policies provide centralized, resource-centric configuration constraints (such as disabling service account key creation across a resource hierarchy) to govern cloud resource behaviors.
iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation apply universally to the resource scope (the folder and its children). They enforce constraints on the resource itself, not on specific IAM identities or groups.breakglass-ops@example.com) within standard Organization Policy constraints.iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation at the folder level blocks all principals, including emergency break-glass administrators, from creating service account keys.The organization intended to completely ban service account key creation across all workloads in the folder with zero identity exceptions.
IAM deny policies allow administrators to define explicit, non-negotiable security boundaries that prevent specific principals from exercising designated permissions, regardless of the allow policies or IAM roles granted to them.
Production-Workloads folder (cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/folders/FOLDER_ID) ensures the deny rules are automatically inherited by all current and future child projects in the folder hierarchy.iam.googleapis.com/serviceAccountKeys.create and iam.googleapis.com/serviceAccountKeys.delete in deniedPermissions restricts the precise API operations associated with service account key generation and destruction.principalSet://goog/group/developers@example.com under deniedPrincipals targets the developer population, while specifying principalSet://goog/group/breakglass-ops@example.com under exceptionPrincipals exempts emergency response operators. During IAM policy evaluation, deny policies are evaluated before allow policies, and principals listed in exceptionPrincipals are completely exempt from the deny rule, allowing their existing allow grants to function normally.roles/owner or roles/editor).v2 policy structure with fully qualified permission identifiers.This solution enforces uniform security guardrails across the entire folder hierarchy while explicitly handling group overlap via exceptionPrincipals. It eliminates the operational overhead of managing individual project-level allow policies and ensures strict enforcement through IAM's built-in evaluation order.
IAM Conditions on allow policy bindings grant access conditionally based on contextual attributes such as resource tags, access levels, or request timestamps.
roles/owner or roles/editor.The goal was to grant temporary or conditional access to a specific role when certain resource tags match, rather than enforcing an overarching negative security boundary.
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