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Your organization is deploying a sensitive data analytics platform on Compute Engine VMs in a custom VPC network with Private Google Access enabled on the subnets. The VMs do not have external IP addresses, and the security team has mandated the following requirements:
203.0.113.0/24.198.51.100.10) that requires requests to originate from a fixed, allowlisted source IP address.Which combination of configurations should you implement?
all-apis bundle with private Cloud DNS for googleapis.com., configure IAM Conditions restricting API calls to 203.0.113.0/24 and the VPC subnet, set egress firewall rules denying 0.0.0.0/0 at priority 65534 and allowing TCP 443 to the endpoint IP and 198.51.100.10 at priority 1000, and deploy Cloud NAT with dynamic IP allocation.This design relies on Private Service Connect with the all-apis bundle, IAM Conditions, priority-ordered egress firewall rules, and Cloud NAT using automatically (dynamically) allocated external IP addresses—without implementing a VPC Service Controls perimeter.
all-apis bundle instead of the vpc-sc bundle permits access to Google APIs and services that are not supported by VPC Service Controls, leaving potential data exfiltration channels open.all-apis bundle: Grants access to all supported Google APIs, including non-VPC-SC services.This configuration would only be suitable if the organization had no requirement to restrict public API endpoints, prevent cross-project exfiltration via VPC Service Controls, or present fixed source IP addresses to external third-party servers.
*.googleapis.com via Cloud DNS to private.googleapis.com (199.36.153.8/30), configure egress firewall rules allowing TCP 443 to 199.36.153.8/30 and 198.51.100.10, and deploy a NAT proxy VM with an external IP for patch downloads.This approach places the project inside a VPC Service Controls perimeter, routes internal Google API traffic through the default private virtual IP (private.googleapis.com at 199.36.153.8/30), permits outbound HTTPS to that range and the repository, and uses a self-managed NAT proxy VM with an external IP address for internet egress.
private.googleapis.com (199.36.153.8/30) inside a VPC Service Controls perimeter negates insider data exfiltration protection. Because the private VIP permits access to Google APIs and services that are not supported by VPC Service Controls, compromised workloads can still exfiltrate data through unsupported Google services.203.0.113.0/24): Omitting an Access Context Manager access level causes the VPC Service Controls perimeter to block all internet-originating requests, preventing corporate administrators from accessing the Google Cloud console and protected APIs from 203.0.113.0/24.private.googleapis.com (199.36.153.8/30) supports most Google APIs, including services outside VPC Service Controls enforcement.restricted.googleapis.com (199.36.153.4/30) or a Private Service Connect endpoint using the vpc-sc bundle limits traffic strictly to VPC Service Controls-supported services.This would not be recommended in a high-security environment; it would only be acceptable if the workload had a hard dependency on unsupported Google APIs outside a perimeter and required a custom proxy appliance instead of managed Cloud NAT.
RESTRICTED-SERVICES, attach an Access Context Manager access level allowing 203.0.113.0/24, configure a Private Service Connect endpoint (vpc-sc bundle) with private Cloud DNS for googleapis.com., set egress firewall rules denying 0.0.0.0/0 at priority 65534 and allowing TCP 443 to the endpoint IP and 198.51.100.10 at priority 1000, deploy Cloud NAT with static external IPs, and apply least-privilege IAM policies.This architecture establishes defense in depth by combining VPC Service Controls, Access Context Manager, Private Service Connect (using the vpc-sc bundle), VPC egress firewall rules, Cloud NAT with static external IP addresses, and least-privilege IAM policies.
203.0.113.0/24: Adding the project to a VPC Service Controls perimeter automatically blocks all public internet access to protected Google Cloud services, even if credentials are stolen or IAM is misconfigured. Attaching an Access Context Manager access level scoped to 203.0.113.0/24 selectively restores Google Cloud console and API access for corporate administrators.vpc-sc bundle and mapping googleapis.com. and *.googleapis.com. in Cloud DNS forces API traffic to the internal endpoint IP and blocks unsupported Google services. Enabling VPC accessible services (RESTRICTED-SERVICES) prevents VMs from reaching unauthorized services, while the perimeter blocks copying data to external buckets outside the perimeter.198.51.100.10: A low-priority (65534) deny-all egress rule (0.0.0.0/0) blocks default Private Google Access VIPs and arbitrary internet destinations, while a higher-priority (1000) allow rule permits TCP 443 exclusively to the Private Service Connect endpoint IP and 198.51.100.10. Cloud NAT with manually allocated static external IP addresses enables private VMs to reach the repository using fixed, allowlisted source IPs.Using the vpc-sc Private Service Connect bundle, explicit priority-ordered egress rules, Access Context Manager access levels, and static-IP Cloud NAT directly addresses every security, connectivity, and compliance constraint without introducing self-managed proxy VMs or exposing unsupported Google APIs.
443 from 203.0.113.0/24 for console access, create a Private Service Connect endpoint (vpc-sc bundle) with private Cloud DNS, set egress firewall rules denying 0.0.0.0/0 at priority 1000 and allowing TCP 443 to the endpoint IP and 198.51.100.10 at priority 65534, deploy Cloud NAT with static external IPs, and apply least-privilege IAM policies.This configuration combines a VPC Service Controls perimeter, a Private Service Connect endpoint (vpc-sc), static-IP Cloud NAT, and IAM policies, but attempts to grant corporate console access via a VPC ingress firewall rule and reverses the numerical priorities of the egress allow and deny firewall rules.
203.0.113.0/24): VPC ingress firewall rules only evaluate packets entering Compute Engine VM network interfaces inside the VPC. They have no control over requests sent from the public internet to Google-managed APIs or the Google Cloud console. To permit 203.0.113.0/24 through the service perimeter, an Access Context Manager access level (or perimeter ingress rule) must be attached to the perimeter.DENY 0.0.0.0/0 at priority 1000 and ALLOW TCP 443 at priority 65534 causes all outbound traffic from the VMs—including traffic to the Private Service Connect endpoint and 198.51.100.10—to match the priority 1000 deny rule and be dropped immediately.0 is the highest precedence and 65535 is the lowest; specific allow rules must always have a numerically lower priority than broad catch-all deny rules.This configuration would work if the VPC ingress firewall rule were replaced with an Access Context Manager access level for 203.0.113.0/24, VPC accessible services were restricted to RESTRICTED-SERVICES, and the egress rule priorities were swapped so the allow rule is at 1000 and the deny-all rule is at 65534.
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