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Your organization is deploying Cloud NGFW Enterprise in us-central1 for Layer 7 intrusion prevention on inbound and outbound HTTPS traffic in a VPC network. You must satisfy these requirements:
Which configuration should you implement?
excludePublicCaSet: true, deploy a CA pool in us-central1 with pathLenConstraint set to 0, grant roles/privateca.certificateRequester to the Network Security service agent, and attach the TLS inspection policy to the firewall endpoint association with --tls-inspect enabled.This configuration attempts to integrate Cloud NGFW Enterprise, Certificate Authority Service (CAS), and Certificate Manager by pairing a us-central1 CA pool with a global trust config and restricting upstream server trust.
us-central1). A global trust config cannot be attached to a regional TLS inspection policy.excludePublicCaSet: true instructs Cloud NGFW to reject all publicly trusted CAs and trust only CAs listed in the trust config. Outbound connections to public internet sites will fail upstream TLS validation.pathLenConstraint to 0 forbids the CA from signing subordinate intermediate CAs. Because Cloud NGFW generates 24-hour intermediate CAs in memory signed by the CA pool, the pool's CAs must have a pathLenConstraint of at least 1.pathLenConstraint of 0 restricts a CA to issuing end-entity leaf certificates only.excludePublicCaSet: true is designed strictly for isolated environments that never validate public certificates.us-central1, excludePublicCaSet were set to false, pathLenConstraint were set to 1 or higher, and the inspection pool's root CA were installed on client VMs.us-central1 without name constraints, grant roles/privateca.certificateRequester to the Network Security service agent, import your existing internal PKI CA with its previously issued certificates into the pool, configure the trust config for public CAs only, and attach the TLS inspection policy to the firewall endpoint association without --tls-inspect on firewall rules.This configuration correctly locates the CA pool in us-central1 without name constraints and assigns roles/privateca.certificateRequester, but attempts to import an existing CA with previously issued certificates, omits private CAs from the trust config, and omits --tls-inspect on firewall policy rules.
--tls-inspect flag.--tls-inspect so administrators can selectively bypass sensitive or pinned traffic.excludePublicCaSet: false, --tls-inspect were enabled on firewall rules, and client VMs trusted the inspection root CA.us-central1 with DNS name constraints for your internal domains, grant roles/privateca.auditor to the Network Security service agent, reference that same CA pool in a us-central1 trust config and TLS inspection policy, and configure firewall policy rules with --target-type=INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB and --tls-inspect.This configuration attempts to restrict certificate issuance using CAS name constraints, assigns read-only auditing permissions to the Network Security service agent, reuses the inspection CA pool as the upstream trust anchor, and targets internal managed load balancers in firewall rules.
roles/privateca.auditor provides only read/audit visibility. The Network Security service agent requires roles/privateca.certificateRequester to request intermediate CA certificates from the pool.--target-type=INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB to protect cross-region internal Application Load Balancers, the load balancer terminates TLS natively and sends plaintext to the firewall endpoint, causing Cloud NGFW to ignore both --tls-inspect and --tls-inspection-policy.roles/privateca.certificateRequester were granted, the trust config held the internal server root CA, rules targeted VPC workloads rather than INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB, and client VMs trusted the inspection root CA.us-central1, ensure the pool's CA has pathLenConstraint >= 1 and no name constraints, grant roles/privateca.certificateRequester to the Network Security service agent, set excludePublicCaSet: false in the TLS inspection policy, attach it to the firewall endpoint association with --tls-inspect on rules, and install the inspection pool's root CA on client VMs.Cloud NGFW Enterprise TLS inspection acts as a transparent proxy within the firewall endpoint to decrypt, inspect at Layer 7 (such as intrusion prevention), and re-encrypt TLS traffic. It integrates Certificate Authority Service (CAS) to mint short-lived 24-hour intermediate CAs in memory and Certificate Manager trust configs to validate privately signed upstream server certificates.
us-central1 with pathLenConstraint >= 1 allows Cloud NGFW to sign its in-memory intermediate CAs. Omitting name constraints prevents invalid certificates, because Cloud NGFW does not enforce CAS pool name constraints when dynamically minting server certificates. Granting roles/privateca.certificateRequester to service-PROJECT_NUMBER@gcp-sa-networksecurity.iam.gserviceaccount.com authorizes the firewall service to request certificates.us-central1 (matching the policy region) and keeping excludePublicCaSet: false allows Cloud NGFW to validate both public CAs and internal private PKI servers.--tls-inspect on the relevant firewall policy rules triggers decryption for matched encrypted flows.--tls-inspect flag lets administrators inspect only specific traffic matched by firewall policy rules.This architecture satisfies every regional alignment, PKI constraint, IAM permission, upstream trust, and client trust requirement needed for reliable Cloud NGFW Layer 7 decryption.
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