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Your organization hosts HTTPS microservices on multi-region Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters using GCE_VM_IP_PORT zonal network endpoint groups (NEGs). You must expose these services while enforcing Google Cloud-native Layer 7 threat prevention (IDS/IPS) and filtering without deploying third-party virtual appliances:
Which configuration should you implement?
apply_security_profile_group rules targeting both the external and internal load balancer forwarding rules, and deploy Cloud IDS endpoints in each GKE subnet to mirror and drop malicious Layer 7 payloads before they reach the Pods.Hierarchical firewall policies enforce organization-wide or folder-wide security guardrails across VPC networks for VM and GKE node traffic, while Cloud Intrusion Detection System (Cloud IDS) uses VPC packet mirroring to send copies of network traffic to a Google-managed peered inspection network for threat visibility and alerting.
INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB) or external Application Load Balancers as rule targets.The organization only needed passive, out-of-band threat detection and forensic alerting for intra-VPC VM/node traffic via Cloud IDS alongside organization-wide L3/L4 or Enterprise VM-level guardrails via hierarchical firewall policies, rather than inline blocking at the load balancer layer.
--target-type=INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB, apply_security_profile_group) in each GKE region and enable --tls-inspect with a TLS inspection policy on the firewall endpoint association so Cloud NGFW decrypts internal load balancer traffic.Regional network firewall policies group Layer 3 and Layer 4 rules scoped to a specific Google Cloud region and VPC network, while Cloud NGFW TLS inspection (--tls-inspect and --tls-inspection-policy) uses Certificate Authority Service intermediate CAs to intercept and decrypt client-to-server TLS sessions passing through a zonal firewall endpoint.
ALLOW/DENY at L3/L4) for Envoy-based load balancers.--tls-inspection-policy and firewall rules with --target-type=INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB ignore --tls-inspect.apply_security_profile_group on load balancer forwarding rules.INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB targets.GCE_VM_IP_PORT backends to permit traffic from the proxy-only subnet and Google health check probe ranges.You only needed Layer 3/Layer 4 source IP filtering on internal Application Load Balancers using Essentials or Standard tier rules in a single region, or if you were configuring --tls-inspect for direct VM-to-internet egress or VM-to-VM encrypted traffic rather than traffic targeting INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB.
apply_security_profile_group) targeting the forwarding rules of both the global external Application Load Balancer and the cross-region internal Application Load Balancer, and apply VPC firewall ingress deny rules directly to the Google Front End (GFE) proxies to block unauthorized external clients.Global network firewall policies apply consistent security rules across VPC networks globally and support Cloud NGFW Enterprise inspection for cross-region internal Application Load Balancers. VPC firewall rules are network-scoped L3/L4 stateful controls applied directly to VM network interfaces (such as Compute Engine VMs or GKE nodes).
INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB) or Layer 7 apply_security_profile_group actions in any tier.GCE_VM_IP_PORT zonal NEGs, VPC/NGFW rules on the GKE nodes must allow ingress from GFE and health check ranges (130.211.0.0/22 and 35.191.0.0/16).Cloud NGFW Enterprise load balancer targeting applied only to the cross-region internal Application Load Balancer, while Google Cloud Armor—rather than GFE-targeted firewall rules—protected the global external Application Load Balancer at the edge.
--target-type=INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB, apply_security_profile_group referencing a threat-prevention security profile) to the internal load balancer's forwarding rule without relying on --tls-inspect.This solution pairs Google Cloud Armor at the internet edge with Cloud Next Generation Firewall (Cloud NGFW) Enterprise integrated directly into the managed Envoy proxies of a cross-region internal Application Load Balancer. Together, they deliver Google Cloud-native Layer 7 threat mitigation for both external and internal traffic without requiring third-party network virtual appliances.
GCE_VM_IP_PORT zonal NEGs.--target-type=INTERNAL_MANAGED_LB and the apply_security_profile_group action intercepts traffic at the Envoy proxy layer. The referenced security profile group contains a threat-prevention security profile powered by Palo Alto Networks signatures to block intrusions, malware, spyware, and command-and-control traffic inline.--tls-inspect unnecessary and ignored.GCE_VM_IP_PORT zonal NEGs.alert, deny, allow) by signature severity or specific threat IDs.Attempting to apply Cloud NGFW forwarding-rule targets to external Application Load Balancers, using regional or hierarchical firewall policies for load balancers, or relying on out-of-band packet mirroring all fail either support constraints or inline blocking requirements. Combining Cloud Armor at the GFE edge with a Cloud NGFW Enterprise global network firewall policy on the cross-region internal Application Load Balancer enforces complete, supported Layer 7 defense-in-depth.
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