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Your continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipelines use Google Cloud Key Management Service (Cloud KMS) to protect sensitive environment configuration files with symmetric encryption keys and sign build provenance attestations using asymmetric keys.
You need to establish an automated lifecycle and rotation policy that avoids pipeline and runtime service disruption, accommodates the behavioral differences between symmetric and asymmetric keys, and safely retires obsolete key versions.
What should you do?
This strategy aligns cryptographic key management with Cloud KMS design constraints by differentiating between symmetric and asymmetric key lifecycles, maintaining backward compatibility for decryption, and enforcing a phased retirement process for decommissioned keys.
This approach leverages native automated features where supported (symmetric rotation schedules) while implementing necessary orchestration for asymmetric keys and safe multi-step retirement (disable -> monitor -> schedule destruction), completely preventing pipeline outages.
This option hardcodes symmetric key versions in CI/CD pipeline code, expects in-place cryptographic overwrites for asymmetric key versions, and relies on immediate hard deletion.
decrypt API calls automatically detect the required version. Pinning explicit version IDs in pipelines creates brittle configurations that break whenever a key rotates.CryptoKeyVersion.SCHEDULED_FOR_DESTRUCTION state for a safety period (default 30 days) to prevent accidental unrecoverable data loss.Symmetric decryption required manual version specification and Cloud KMS allowed mutable in-place key updates, neither of which reflects Cloud KMS architecture.
This option attempts to manage key lifecycle by deleting and recreating the parent KeyRing and its child CryptoKey resources inside CI/CD automation.
KeyRing and CryptoKey resources cannot be deleted once created. This design guarantees resource name immutability and auditability.CryptoKeyVersion instances can have their key material destroyed.Cloud KMS supported soft-deleting and recreating key rings and keys with deterministic key derivation across recreations, which is fundamentally unsupported.
This option attempts to apply a unified automatic rotation policy across all keys and immediately destroys historical key versions upon rotation while relying on root CryptoKey resource names.
CryptoKeyVersion resource ID, not just the base CryptoKey name.Cloud KMS supported automatic rotation and transparent version inference for asymmetric cryptographic keys, and if all pipeline artifacts and secrets were ephemeral and discarded instantly upon rotation.
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