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An enterprise is deploying a centralized analytics lakehouse on Google Cloud to process data across multiple business units. As the lead data engineer, you must establish an enterprise-level security baseline using Organization Policy constraints applied at the root organization node.
The baseline must satisfy three security requirements:
Which set of organization policy constraints should you enforce at the organization level to meet these requirements?
constraints/gcp.resourceLocations, constraints/iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation, and constraints/storage.publicAccessPrevention across the organization hierarchy.Google Cloud Organization Policies provide centralized governance across the resource hierarchy (Organization, Folders, and Projects). They enforce guardrails and constraints on resources regardless of the Cloud IAM roles granted to individual developers.
constraints/gcp.resourceLocations): This list constraint restricts the physical locations where new resources across supported Google Cloud services (such as BigQuery, Dataproc, Cloud Spanner, and Cloud Storage) can be created, ensuring full compliance with corporate data residency policies.constraints/iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation): This boolean constraint prevents users and automated processes from creating external, user-managed private keys (.json or .p12) for service accounts, thereby eliminating the attack vector of leaked credentials.constraints/storage.publicAccessPrevention): This boolean constraint enforces Public Access Prevention on Cloud Storage buckets, denying all operations that grant public access permissions (such as allUsers and allAuthenticatedUsers) via IAM policies or ACLs.This approach directly targets the exact built-in organization policy constraints designed to enforce geographic boundaries, credential protection, and storage exposure prevention natively without relying on post-deployment scripts or manual reviews.
custom.ensureVersionDestroyTTLAtLeast30hours and attach VPC Service Controls perimeters around each individual project.This option deploys custom Organization Policy constraints on Secret Manager to control version destruction delay (version_destroy_ttl) and wraps each individual project in separate VPC Service Controls (VPC SC) perimeters.
constraints/storage.publicAccessPrevention for preventing bucket public access.This approach would be relevant if the organization needed to prevent immediate accidental deletion of encryption keys/secrets in Secret Manager while enforcing network perimeter boundaries to mitigate unauthorized data exfiltration.
constraints/compute.vmExternalIpAccess, constraints/iam.allowServiceAccountCredentialLifetime, and constraints/storage.uniformBucketLevelAccess at the organization node.This option combines constraints that control VM external IP allocations, maximum credential lifetimes for OAuth2 tokens, and uniform bucket-level access.
constraints/compute.vmExternalIpAccess restricts which Compute Engine virtual machines can have external IP addresses; it does not control geographic resource locations or data residency for storage and data processing systems.constraints/iam.allowServiceAccountCredentialLifetime manages the duration for which temporary credentials or tokens can remain valid, but it does not block developers from creating long-lived private key files.constraints/storage.uniformBucketLevelAccess ensures that Cloud Storage ACLs are ignored in favor of IAM policies, but it does not prevent an administrator from mistakenly granting roles/storage.objectViewer to allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers.This configuration would be appropriate if the goal was to eliminate object ACLs, limit Compute Engine public networking, and restrict maximum token expiration lifetimes across the organization.
resourcemanager.projects.create, iam.serviceAccountKeys.create, and storage.buckets.setIamPolicy on all developer groups.This option uses Cloud IAM Deny policies to block specified IAM permissions on designated user and developer groups.
resourcemanager.projects.create halts project creation altogether rather than enforcing granular regional data boundary rules on resource deployments across projects.storage.buckets.setIamPolicy breaks normal administrative delegation by preventing legitimate internal IAM updates rather than selectively denying public principals (allUsers).gcp.resourceLocations).storage.buckets.setIamPolicy prevents pipeline tools and project owners from granting authorized internal users access to datasets.This approach would be suitable if you needed an identity-centric policy layer to override granted IAM roles for specific risky operations across designated principal groups regardless of resource configurations.
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