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An enterprise is deploying an automated data processing service on Compute Engine instances in Google Cloud. The application requires read-only access to files in a dedicated Cloud Storage bucket (company-data-prod) and permission to publish messages to a specific Pub/Sub topic (data-processed-topic).
The security architect must adhere to the following governance requirements:
Which configuration meets these requirements?
This approach provisions a user-managed service account but binds the legacy Editor basic role at the project level while granting the Service Account Token Creator role (roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator) to the deployment engineers.
roles/editor) role contains thousands of permissions across almost all Google Cloud services, violating least-privilege principles and exposing the entire project to unauthorized modifications.roles/iam.serviceAccountUser role, not roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator.roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator allows principals to generate short-lived OAuth2 tokens, OpenID Connect tokens, and signed blobs, which is unnecessary and creates an unneeded attack vector for direct programmatic token minting.roles/editor to workload service accounts.The DevOps team needed to mint signed URLs and JWTs directly via the IAM Credentials API for local debugging, and the workload required unrestricted management access across all project resources.
This strategy creates a user-managed service account but assigns broad administrative predefined roles (roles/storage.admin and roles/pubsub.admin) at the project level, applies project-wide impersonation rights, and enables domain-wide delegation.
roles/storage.admin and roles/pubsub.admin allows deleting buckets, altering schema topics, creating subscriptions, and modifying IAM policies across the entire project.roles/iam.serviceAccountUser at the project level fails the requirement to prevent DevOps engineers from impersonating other identities in the project.The service account acted as a centralized administrative orchestrator that managed all storage and messaging lifecycle configurations and required access to Google Workspace APIs via user impersonation.
This architecture employs a dedicated user-managed service account configured with fine-grained, resource-level IAM bindings and utilizes role-scoped impersonation permissions for operational deployment.
roles/editor role).roles/storage.objectViewer directly on the company-data-prod bucket and roles/pubsub.publisher directly on the data-processed-topic Pub/Sub topic restricts API access to only the specific target resources and operations required, completely avoiding broad project-wide roles.https://www.googleapis.com/auth/cloud-platform (full API access) delegates authorization entirely to IAM allow policies rather than relying on coarse-grained, bucket-agnostic OAuth access scopes.roles/iam.serviceAccountUser directly on the resource level of the custom service account (rather than project-wide) allows DevOps engineers to attach only this specific identity to instances without exposing other project identities to unauthorized impersonation.Binding predefined least-privilege roles directly at the target resource level and scoping the roles/iam.serviceAccountUser binding to the service account resource itself enforces zero trust and least-privilege governance across both the runtime environment and administrative workflows.
This configuration retains the Compute Engine default service account and relies on legacy OAuth access scopes configured on the virtual machine instance to filter outbound API calls, combined with a project-wide grant of the Service Account User role.
roles/editor), violating least-privilege principles.devstorage.read_only). They cannot enforce resource-specific restrictions, meaning the VM could read any bucket across the project rather than only company-data-prod.roles/iam.serviceAccountUser at the project level allows DevOps engineers to act as any existing or future service account in the project, creating significant privilege escalation risks.You were running rapid local prototyping in an isolated non-production project with no regulatory compliance requirements and wished to rely entirely on default infrastructure settings without configuring IAM policies.
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