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Free sample question, answered and explained below. The Professional Cloud Security Engineer practice bank has 1,343 more like it. Try 10 free: instant score, no account.
An enterprise maintains a legacy on-premises continuous integration and continuous deployment (CI/CD) system that cannot support Workload Identity Federation and requires a user-managed service account key to deploy infrastructure to Google Cloud. Security policy mandates:
Which architecture should the security team implement to satisfy these requirements?
Policy Simulator is an IAM governance tool used to evaluate the impact of proposed IAM policy changes before applying them to production resources. It does not perform scheduled tasks or generate authentication credentials. Cloud Storage Object Versioning preserves historical copies of overwritten or deleted storage objects.
serviceAccounts.keys.create API, or act as an orchestration framework.The requirement was to model and test the security impact of modifying IAM role bindings on a service account prior to applying policy updates in production.
Cloud Key Management Service (Cloud KMS) manages cryptographic keys (symmetric and asymmetric) used for data encryption (envelope encryption) and digital signatures. Cloud KMS provides automated rotation for symmetric encryption keys, which creates a new primary key version used for subsequent encryption operations while keeping older key versions available to decrypt existing ciphertexts.
.json private key). The underlying service account credential remains static, expired, or unrotated in Google Cloud IAM.The objective was encrypting stored data at rest or implementing envelope encryption for sensitive payload data within configuration files rather than lifecycle rotation of IAM credentials.
Secret Manager provides native support for automated secret rotation by integrating with Cloud Pub/Sub and serverless compute such as Cloud Functions or Cloud Run. This pattern decouples credential consumers from key creation lifecycles, allowing workloads to query the latest version of a secret dynamically while automated background workflows manage creation, delivery, and disposal of underlying credentials.
projects.serviceAccounts.keys.create) to generate a new key, and writes the JSON key payload directly as a new secret version using the Secret Manager API (projects.secrets.addVersion). The CI/CD toolchain retrieves projects/{project}/secrets/{secret}/versions/latest at runtime.projects.serviceAccounts.keys.delete.projects.serviceAccounts.keys.disable) or delete the specific compromised key ID and destroy the corresponding Secret Manager version without deleting or modifying the underlying service account identity or its IAM bindings.roles/iam.serviceAccountKeyAdmin on the target service account and roles/secretmanager.admin on the secret, maintaining tight privilege boundaries.This architecture completely automates the service account key lifecycle natively within Google Cloud while keeping external legacy pipelines operational and providing fine-grained incident response capabilities for key invalidation.
Deleting and recreating a service account creates a brand new service account resource that shares the same email address but receives a completely new internal unique numerical ID (Unique ID).
deleted:serviceAccount:...). Recreating a service account with the same email results in an identity with zero inherited IAM permissions, breaking the CI/CD pipeline.The service account identity itself was completely compromised and all historical authorization audit trails needed to be permanently severed.
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