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A security operations team is investigating an incident triggered by an Event Threat Detection finding: Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Admin Activity.
While analyzing the raw Google Cloud Admin Activity audit log entry associated with the incident in Cloud Logging, the analyst observes the following authenticationInfo and requestMetadata structure:
{
"protoPayload": {
"serviceName": "storage.googleapis.com",
"methodName": "storage.buckets.setIamPolicy",
"authenticationInfo": {
"principalEmail": "prod-backup-manager@company-prod.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
"serviceAccountDelegationInfo": [
{
"principalEmail": "cicd-deployer@company-prod.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
},
{
"principalEmail": "external-contractor@partner.com"
}
]
},
"requestMetadata": {
"callerIp": "198.51.100.24"
}
}
}
How should the security analyst interpret the identity hierarchy and audit fields to reconstruct this security event?
prod-backup-manager, the original caller who initiated the chain was external-contractor, and cicd-deployer served as an intermediate delegated service account.In Google Cloud Audit Logs, when API calls are executed using service account impersonation or delegation chains, the protoPayload.authenticationInfo object records both the direct identity whose privileges were evaluated and the sequence of identities that delegated those privileges.
principalEmail): The top-level principalEmail field (prod-backup-manager@company-prod.iam.gserviceaccount.com) records the final service account whose IAM permissions authorized the storage.buckets.setIamPolicy method.serviceAccountDelegationInfo bottom): In multi-step delegation chains, the entries in serviceAccountDelegationInfo describe the delegation sequence in reverse order; the principal at the bottom (the last element of the list, external-contractor@partner.com) is the originating actor who initiated the impersonation sequence.cicd-deployer@company-prod.iam.gserviceaccount.com) represent intermediate service accounts whose credentials or tokens were generated along the transitive delegation chain.external-contractor@partner.com is the initial identity requiring credential revocation and compromise assessment.iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken or roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator) spanning from external-contractor through cicd-deployer to prod-backup-manager.198.51.100.24 back to the external entity that originated the request.Understanding the ordering within serviceAccountDelegationInfo ensures investigators do not misattribute malicious changes solely to the service account executing the API call, enabling full remediation of the compromised originating identity and intermediate privilege escalation vectors.
cicd-deployer because it appears first in serviceAccountDelegationInfo, and external-contractor is an authorized spectator or secondary approver.This option assumes that array indexing in serviceAccountDelegationInfo starts with the initiating caller at index 0 and interprets additional entries as passive stakeholders or notification recipients.
[0]) is the immediate parent in the delegation step, whereas the originating caller who started the chain is located at the very bottom (the last index) of the list.serviceAccountDelegationInfo exclusively logs identities involved in active token delegation and impersonation; it does not log passive approvers, notification contacts, or spectators.cicd-deployer as the initial source of the intrusion rather than an intermediate hop.external-contractor as the actual threat actor who generated the initial token request.Google Cloud Audit Logs recorded delegation chains chronologically from index 0 downward, which is the reverse of how the logging architecture structures delegation metadata.
prod-backup-manager without delegation, and the serviceAccountDelegationInfo list displays the identities whose IAM permissions were removed by the policy update.This option confuses the identity performing the administrative action with the delta/payload changes executed by the setIamPolicy method.
protoPayload.authenticationInfo, whereas changes to IAM policy bindings (additions or deletions) are recorded inside protoPayload.serviceData or protoPayload.request.serviceAccountDelegationInfo explicitly confirms that token delegation or service account impersonation occurred during API authentication.The log represented a direct key authentication event where prod-backup-manager signed in directly without intermediate actors, and the policy modification removed cicd-deployer and external-contractor from a bucket binding.
external-contractor, who directly impersonated cicd-deployer, while prod-backup-manager represents the target resource being modified.This option incorrectly treats the top-level principalEmail as a modified resource reference and views external-contractor as the direct identity evaluated by the Cloud Storage IAM engine.
principalEmail: The protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail field always specifies the identity that authorized the API execution, not a managed resource or target object.protoPayload.resourceName and resource.labels, never inside authenticationInfo.principalEmail.external-contractor as the authorizing credential for storage.buckets.setIamPolicy, ignoring that the user lacked direct permissions on the Cloud Storage bucket.The user external-contractor had directly invoked the API using their own personal IAM permissions on the bucket without impersonating any service accounts.
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