Professional Cloud Security Engineer
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A security operations team is investigating unauthorized modifications made to sensitive cloud storage buckets. The actions were executed directly by a privileged deployment service account. The team needs to trace the authentic originating human principal who initiated the impersonated session and prevent future credential exfiltration risks by enforcing short-lived impersonation workflows enterprise-wide.
Which combination of Cloud Audit Log inspection and Organization Policy enforcement should the security engineer implement?
Inspect protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail to view the originating caller, and enforce the iam.disableCrossProjectServiceAccountUsage organization policy constraint.
Inspect protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp to correlate the human identity via external IdP logs, and enforce the iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains organization policy constraint.
Inspect protoPayload.authenticationInfo.serviceAccountDelegationInfo in Cloud Audit Logs to identify the originating principal in the delegation chain, and enforce the iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation organization policy constraint.
Inspect protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta to trace the token generation permissions, and enforce the compute.setNewProjectDefaultToZonalDNSOnly organization policy constraint.
Inspect protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail to view the originating caller, and enforce the iam.disableCrossProjectServiceAccountUsage organization policy constraint.
Inspect protoPayload.requestMetadata.callerIp to correlate the human identity via external IdP logs, and enforce the iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains organization policy constraint.
Inspect protoPayload.authenticationInfo.serviceAccountDelegationInfo in Cloud Audit Logs to identify the originating principal in the delegation chain, and enforce the iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation organization policy constraint.
This solution pairs deep Cloud Audit Log inspection of the serviceAccountDelegationInfo metadata structure with the organization-wide policy constraint constraints/iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation to enforce identity traceability and eliminate static credential leakage.
generateAccessToken), Cloud Audit Logs record the impersonated service account in protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail. Crucially, the actual originating caller or sequence of delegates is populated in protoPayload.authenticationInfo.serviceAccountDelegationInfo, allowing forensic investigators to pinpoint the exact human user who initiated the action.iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation blocks developers and administrators from creating user-managed, downloadable RSA private keys (.json or .p12 files). This mandates the use of short-lived credential generation, identity federation, or direct impersonation patterns, removing long-lived static keys that could otherwise be leaked or stolen from developer workstations.Inspecting serviceAccountDelegationInfo is the only Google Cloud native logging mechanism that captures the full delegation lineage during service account impersonation. Combining this detective control with the preventive guardrail iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation achieves full zero-trust credential hygiene by replacing vulnerable static keys with short-lived, fully auditable impersonated credentials.
Inspect protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta to trace the token generation permissions, and enforce the compute.setNewProjectDefaultToZonalDNSOnly organization policy constraint.