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Free sample question, answered and explained below. The Professional Cloud DevOps Engineer practice bank has 1,455 more like it. Try 10 free: instant score, no account.
Your enterprise security policy mandates that Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters in your production Google Cloud project only deploy container images that have verified build provenance and an attestation from Cloud Build. You execute builds inside Cloud Build private worker pools.
During pipeline testing, your single Cloud Build configuration file builds the Docker container, pushes it to Artifact Registry via an explicit docker push build step, and attempts to deploy the image directly to GKE. However, Binary Authorization blocks the deployment because the required built-by-cloud-build attestation is missing.
Which combination of actions should you take to ensure the attestation is properly generated and verified?
This approach attempts to manually generate a custom attestation within the build step using a Cloud Key Management Service (Cloud KMS) asymmetric signing key and the Artifact Analysis API.
built-by-cloud-build attestor. Manual attestations created via custom keys map to custom user-owned attestors, not Google Cloud's managed builder identity.requestedVerifyOption).You were implementing a custom, third-party manual quality-gate attestor (such as a vulnerability scanner or QA sign-off) where an external system must cryptographically sign off before production deployment.
This option attempts to fix the issue by granting the Cloud Build service account IAM permissions to view attestor metadata and using --digest-file during the Docker push command.
--digest-file to an explicit docker push build step does not make Cloud Build register the image in its metadata pipeline. Cloud Build strictly requires the top-level images field to trigger attestation generation.requestedVerifyOption: VERIFIED is specified in the configuration.attestorsViewer does not provide build signing capabilities.docker push do not substitute for Cloud Build's native images manifest capture.Cloud Build were acting as a downstream consumer querying Binary Authorization attestor configurations in a read-only policy verification pipeline.
This option modifies the Binary Authorization policy to allow all container images regardless of attestations, logging evaluation results to Cloud Audit Logs without blocking non-compliant deployments.
ALWAYS_ALLOW disables policy enforcement entirely, directly violating the enterprise mandate that only verified images with build provenance be admitted.docker push, and single-pipeline design) that prevented attestation creation in the first place.DRYRUN_AUDIT_LOG_ONLY is intended for monitoring and policy development, not for enforcing zero-trust supply chain requirements.The objective was to conduct an initial policy rollout audit to observe what traffic would be blocked before enforcing strict admission controls.
Google Cloud provides automated build provenance and attestation generation through Cloud Build and Binary Authorization. When properly configured, Cloud Build generates a verifiable cryptographic attestation associated with the built-by-cloud-build attestor upon successful completion of a build.
requestedVerifyOption: VERIFIED to the options block of the build configuration explicitly enables attestation generation.docker push step is used. Images must be specified under the top-level images field in the build config so that Cloud Build manages the upload and captures the digest necessary for the attestation.This approach leverages native, fully managed platform controls to ensure zero-trust supply chain validation while adhering directly to Cloud Build's architectural lifecycle requirements.
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